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A LEGAL WAR ON TERRORISM:
EXTENDING NEW YORK V. QUARLES
AND THE DEPARTURE FROM ENEMY
COMBATANT DESIGNATIONS
INTRODUCTION
During turbulent times, the United States government has difficulty
balancing rights fundamental to all Americans-the rights to life, lib-
erty, and the pursuit of happiness.' This Comment examines our gov-
ernment's inveterate struggle to preserve its citizens' right to "liberty"
while simultaneously protecting their right to "life." Adequately bal-
ancing these considerations has proved difficult time and time again.
"When conditions are especially turbulent and the general populace
perceives a threat to its way of life, the chances of a miscarriage of
justice are substantially increased." '2
The storybook of American history is blotched with several in-
stances of governmental overreaction during uncertain times. Hind-
sight bias incessantly leads the legal community to utter the same
sorrowful words: "If we knew then what we know now." By that
point, however, it is usually too late. Evidence of our government's
chronic inability to provide its citizens with concurrent protection of
life and liberty during unstable times begins at our nation's founding.
While America's naissance was assumedly motivated by principles of
sovereignty and equality, 3 our forefathers allowed for the continued
importation of individuals for the purpose of slavery.4 The prohibi-
tion placed on Congress against banning slavery,5 conduct defined by
its restriction on individual liberty, was directly in conflict with the
1. "We hold these truths to be self-evident that all men are created equal, that they are en-
dowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and
the pursuit of Happiness." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. Stephan Landsman, When Justice Fails, 84 MICH. L. REV. 824, 834 (1986) (book review).
3. "All men are created equal." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2.
4. The United States Constitution provides, "The Migration or Importation of such Persons as
any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Con-
gress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
5. In essence, the constitutional prohibition placed on Congress was aimed directly at the
importation of slaves. A great deal of debate existed throughout the revolutionary era (as well
as today) as to whether the Constitution restricted federal legislation against the institution of
slavery as a whole. For a more in-depth discussion about the revolutionary debate over the issue
of slavery, see JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION, ch.
3 (Vintage Books 2002) (2000).
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values of the newly established American republic. 6 This contradic-
tion between American ideology and behavior can be attributed to
the instability of the newly formed American government. 7 America
gained freedom from England only fourteen years earlier. Several
states south of the Potomac threatened not to ratify the Constitution if
it prohibited slavery.8 When later faced with a request to interpret the
Constitution as allowing for the prohibition of slavery, Congress chose
silence, setting the issue aside for later assessment. 9 The government
found it beneficial for America's future not to immediately abolish the
institution of slavery.10 This lack of decisive action at our nation's
founding resulted in several decades of continued oppression that ulti-
mately ended in a gruesome civil war."
A second unfortunate government overreaction in the wake of an
unstable domestic environment occurred on December 18, 1944, when
the United States Supreme Court upheld a military order permitting
discrimination against individuals of Japanese descent.' 2 In reaction
to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and America's subsequent
declaration of war on Japan, the executive branch implemented sev-
eral military orders and proclamations that limited the rights of Japa-
6. The American Revolution was fought in pursuit of freedom from the coercive shackles
placed on the colonies by the British government. The colonies' final declaration of indepen-
dence "clearly announced that it was 'not possible that one man should have property ... in
another."' Id. at 86 (quoting FIRST CONGRESS, Vol. 12, 298-99, 305-06). However, the 1790
census of the United States accounted for over 690,000 individuals whose liberty was completely
restricted. Id. at 102.
7. The Constitutional Convention, accredited for solidifying the American union, took place
only three years earlier. While the American colonies were unified in their objection to British
control, a great deal of conflict existed between them concerning highly sensitive issues. Topping
this list were the amount of power to be vested within a federal government, the geographical
placement of a permanent American capital, and the continuance of slavery. Of these, the most
heated debate existed between state delegations dependent on slavery and those delegations
that were not. The drafters of the Constitution, in order to prevent the demise of a newly
formed republic, chose evasiveness as a temporary solution to this problem. See generally ELLIS,
supra note 5, at 81-118.
8. See generally ELLIS, supra note 5, at 81-118.
9. On February 11, 1790, two Quaker delegations from New York and Philadelphia presented
petitions to the House calling for an immediate end to the African slave trade. Id. at 81. The
following day, another petition arrived from the Pennsylvania Abolition Society demanding an
end not only to slave trade, but to slavery as a whole. Id. at 83.
10. Id.
11. The American Civil War claimed the lives of over 600,000 individuals and caused social
repercussions that still exist after more than 100 years. ELLIS, supra note 5, at 88.
12. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Toyosaburo Korematsu was convicted of
violating an order that precluded him from entering San Leandro, California-the city in which
he lived-simply because of his Japanese descent. The order, Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of
the Commanding General of the Western Command, U.S. Army stated, "[A]fter May 9, 1942, all
persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from [San Leandro, California]." Id. at 215-16.
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nese-American citizens.13 The government defended the exclusionary
order, claiming it was necessary due to "the presence of an unascer-
tained number of disloyal members of the [Japanese population], most
of whom.., no doubt were loyal to this country.' 1 4 Military authori-
ties found it impossible to segregate only the disloyal members from
the group, which the Supreme Court subsequently determined was an
acceptable rationale for the segregation of all Japanese individuals
from the rest of the population.15 The Court, while "not unmindful of
the hardships imposed ... upon a large group of American citizens, '16
found that conditions of modern warfare sufficiently justified the se-
curity measures taken by the American military. 17 In distinguishing
between general unequal treatment of one race and the current en-
dorsement of racial segregation by the military, the Court said,
"[p]ressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of
such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.' 8 The wartime intern-
ment of Japanese-Americans has been described as "one of America's
grossest violations of civil liberties, forcing an entire race to labor
under a collective presumption of guilt." 19
Arguably, no recent chapter in our nation's history caused more
turbulence to the American status quo than the attacks of September
11, 2001.20 These acts of international terrorism took place on
America's soil, causing a level of insecurity among our countrymen
not felt since the duck and cover days of the Cold War. As a result,
our government is taking several steps to re-establish our national "se-
curity."'2 1 One feature of this governmental action is the labeling of
13. Id. at 216. These orders and proclamations were substantially based upon an Executive
Order, which stated in part, "the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible pro-
tection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense
premises, and national-defense utilities." Id. at 217 (quoting Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg.
1407 (Feb. 19, 1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Id. at 218-19.
15. Id. at 219.
16. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
17. Id. at 223-24.
18. Id. at 216.
19. Carl Takei, A Lesson of Injustice From 1942, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 18, 2003, at All.
20. At 8:45 a.m. (EDT) on September 11, 2001, American Airlines Flight 11, flying out of
Boston, Massachusetts, was hijacked and crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade
Center. Carrie L. Groskopf, Note, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It: The Supreme Court's Unneces-
sary Departure From Precedent in Kyllo v. United States, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 201 (2002). At
9:03 a.m. (EDT), United Airlines Flight 175, also hijacked, flew into the South Tower. Id.
Within an hour, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon and United Airlines
Flight 93 crashed into a field in Somerset County, Pennsylvania. Id. at 201-02.
21. See infra notes 128-140 and accompanying text.
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suspected terrorists as "enemy combatants. '22 The enemy combatant
designation is a tool used by the federal government in times of war 23
to circumvent limitations placed upon it by the Constitution when in-
terrogating suspected terrorists.24 This Comment explores the enemy
combatant designation and attempts to determine what rights an
American citizen 25 suspected of terrorism should be afforded, as com-
pared to rights traditionally given an accused criminal or prisoner of
war.
2 6
22. Neal R. Sonnett, et al., ABA Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants, Preliminary
Report (Aug. 8, 2002) available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/enemy-combatants.pdf (last
visited Aug. 4, 2003).
23. War exists when "a state of war has been declared or when activities involving the use of
force rise to such a level that a state of war exists." Sonnett, et al., supra note 22, at 7, n.10.
While al Qaeda is not technically a nation, the joint resolution passed by Congress on September
18, 2001, infra note 131 and accompanying text, combined with United States operations in Af-
ghanistan, arguably justifies a conclusion that the United States is currently at war. Id.
24. President Bush made it clear in his November Order that "[t]o protect the United States
and its citizens, and for the effective conduct of military operations and prevention of terrorist
attacks, it is necessary for individuals subject to this order ... to be detained." See Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War against Terrorism, November 13, 2001,
66 FR 57833, 2001 WL 1435652 (Pres.) [hereinafter November Order], par. l(e). Further evi-
dence of the government's motives for detaining enemy combatants is clear from court opinions
declaring the detainment permissible: "Believing that Hamdi's detention is necessary for intelli-
gence gathering efforts, the United States has determined that Hamdi should continue to be
detained as an enemy combatant in accordance with the laws and customs of war." Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). "[Padilla] is being detained in order
to interrogate him about the unlawful organization with which he is said to be affiliated and with
which the military is in active combat, and to prevent him from becoming reaffiliated with that
organization." Padilla ex rel Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564,588 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The
government's reasoning for this detainment begs the question: "Is [detaining enemy combatants]
an appropriate response to a serious security threat or a ploy to circumvent the U.S. Constitu-
tion?" Kenneth Roth, Foreign Enemies and Constitutional Rights, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 10, 2002, at
11.
25. While considerable attention should be given to the legality of the government's detain-
ment of foreign nationals in immigration proceedings, as well as to the use of the enemy combat-
ant designation on foreign nationals currently held at Guantanamo Bay, this Comment is limited
to a discussion of American citizens.
26. The third Geneva Convention defined "prisoner of war" as a person who has fallen into
the power of the enemy and can be included in one of the following six categories: (1) member
or volunteer "of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict"; (2) member of "other militias and
... other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a
Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory . . . provided that such
militias" are "commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates," have a "fixed distinctive
sign recognizable at a distance," carry "arms openly," or "[conduct] their operations in accor-
dance with the laws and customs of war"; (3) member of "regular armed forces who professes
allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power"; (4) person
who "accompan[ies] the armed forces without actually being members thereof"; (5) member of a
crew for "the merchant marine and ... civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not
benefit by more favourable treatment under any other provisions of international law"; and (6)
inhabitants "of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take
up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular
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The recent use of enemy combatant designations by the administra-
tion of President George Walker Bush is quite unusual, primarily be-
cause the label has lain dormant for over five decades.27 This sudden
revival of an only partially developed government instrument might
potentially damage the legitimacy of the Bush Administration by arbi-
trarily eliminating several predetermined American principles. At the
crux of the matter resides Fifth Amendment protections, separation of
powers, and judicial review. 28
This Comment analyzes the enemy combatant designation placed
on American citizens by the American government, both past and
present. Part II briefly reviews Supreme Court case law attempting to
establish the boundaries of enemy combatant jurisprudence. 29 It fur-
ther discusses the Bush Administration's current use of enemy com-
batant designations against individuals suspected of terrorism. 30 Part
III presents consequences of the current enemy combatant designa-
tions.3t It highlights the effects of President Bush's orders on individ-
uals suspected of terrorism, 32 evaluates the actions taken by the Bush
Administration, 33 and sets forth a feasible alternative to the use of
enemy combatant designations when dealing with America's "war on
terrorism." 34 Specifically, subpart D of Part III suggests an expansion
of the public safety exception set forth in New York v. Quarles.35 Part
IV suggests how the government's decisions in dealing with terrorist
threats will impact the legitimacy of the Bush Administration. 36 In
conclusion, Part V stresses the immediate need for the Bush Adminis-
tration to reassess its current methods.
II. BACKGROUND
Several consequences emerge when the United States government
labels a criminal suspect an "enemy combatant." For instance, the la-
bel requires a trial before a military commission, which denies several
armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war." Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 (Geneva
Convention III).
27. The most recent case dealing directly with the constitutionality of the enemy combatant
designation is Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). See infra notes 77-122 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 164-262 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 41-127 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 128-140 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 148-163 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 164-238 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 239-260 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 261-299 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 261-299 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 302-314 and accompanying text.
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individual rights typically afforded to prisoners of war and criminals
tried in civilian courts.37 Consequently, a comprehensive understand-
ing of the method used to determine who falls under this label is criti-
cal. Over the past two and a half centuries of American juris-
prudence, courts have provided nominal assistance in defining con-
duct worthy of rescinding a wartime enemy's constitutional rights.38
This section presents the constitutional analysis undertaken by the ju-
diciary in determining the legality of the enemy combatant designa-
tion and its consequences. 39 Additionally, this section describes the
current use of enemy combatant designations by the United States
government.40
A. Enemy Combatant Jurisprudence: A "Short" Walk
Through Time
Well rooted in our nation's history is the notion that an individual
can act so defiantly that he loses certain civil rights.41 This restriction
on individual rights occurs most often during times of war.4 2 The gov-
ernment gave individuals in violation of the law of war 43 fewer rights
prior to the adoption of the Constitution and during the Civil War.44
Nonetheless, actual cases dealing with enemy combatants are few in
number. This section summarizes case law relevant to determining
the definition of an enemy combatant and the constitutional implica-
tions behind the label.
37. See infra notes 148-162 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 43-124 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 43-124 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 128-140 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 44, 116-117.
42. The governmental restriction on individual rights in the context of enemy combatant des-
ignations is completed by subjecting these individuals to trial before military tribunals. See infra
note 44.
43. The Supreme Court relied on international law when forming its definition of the "law of
war," which it described as "that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of
war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals." Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942).
44. The Quirin Court highlights numerous instances during the Civil War where military com-
missions were created for the trial of Confederate enemies in 1865. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 13
n.10. These instances include the cases of T.E. Hogg (charging defendant with coming aboard a
United States merchant steamer in the guise of a peaceful passenger while being commissioned
by the Confederate Government for the purpose of capturing the vessel and converting her to a
Confederate cruiser); John Beall (charging defendant with coming aboard a military vessel in
civilian dress and attempting to derail a train while in disguise); and Robert Kennedy (charging
defendant with attempting to set fire to the city of New York, while in disguise). Id. Each of
these individuals was charged with being a spy in violation of the laws of war and sentenced to
be hanged. Id.
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1. Lincoln Responds to a Confederate Uprising: The Military
Tribunal
The Civil War is perhaps the most gruesome illustration of a nation
torn apart by its incompatible beliefs only to grow stronger subse-
quent to the bloodshed. During the war, however, the threat of per-
manent succession appeared more probable than the eventual
evolution of America into an international superpower. As the battles
dragged on, civilian war protesters plagued Union territories, recruit-
ing men for the Confederate army.45 On April 27, 1861, President
Abraham Lincoln declared that any individual who discouraged en-
listment in the Union army or "engaged in disloyal practices would be
subject to trial in a military commission, regardless of whether they
were civilians or military. ' 46 In addition to prosecuting these individ-
uals before a military commission, Lincoln suspended each individ-
ual's right to remove his case to a civilian court or file a writ of habeas
corpus.47 While the following two cases do not directly discuss the
issue of enemy combatant designations, they are essential to a full un-
derstanding of the current enemy combatant dilemma. Lincoln's reac-
tion to civil disruption and the cases it generated, laid a foundation for
the trial of civilians by military commissions.
a. Ex parte Merryman48
As a result of Lincoln's proclamation, John Merryman was arrested
on May 25, 1861 for the destruction of railroad bridges in Baltimore,
Maryland. 49 While Merryman was detained in Fort McHenry, his at-
torney filed a writ of habeas corpus with General George Cadwalader,
challenging the lawfulness of Merryman's detainment.5 0 Chief Justice
Roger B. Taney issued the writ, ordering the military to "bring Mer-
ryman before the circuit court in Baltimore. ' 51 Cadwalader refused to
release Merryman, thereby failing to comply with Taney's orders.5 2
45. Anne English French, Trials in Times of War: Do the Bush Military Commissions Sacrifice
Our Freedoms?, 63 OHIo ST. L.J. 1225, 1228-29 (2002).
46. Id. at 1229.
47. Id.
48. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
49. See French, supra note 45, at 1229 n.17.
50. See id. at 1229. General Cadwalader was the commander of Fort McHenry, where Mer-
ryman was being held. Id.
51. See id.
52. See id. Taney ordered Cadwalader to appear before him in Baltimore with Merryman for
a hearing on May 27, 1861. Id. Upon Cadwalader's noncompliance, Taney ordered him to ap-
pear the following day, which Cadwalader also refused. French, supra note 45, at 1229.
20031
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He used President Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
to justify his noncompliance. 53
Chief Justice Taney, writing for the United States Supreme Court,
declared Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus unconstitu-
tional.54 Taney, looking to the Constitution, emphasized the structure
of American government as one of "delegated and limited power.
55
He argued that the President could not suspend the writ of habeas
corpus, a power reserved for the legislative branch even in times of
war.5 6 In addition, Taney argued that Merryman's status as a civilian
from Indiana precluded the military from exercising judicial authority
over him.57 Consequently, Lincoln released Merryman. 58
Neither Taney's decision nor Merryman's subsequent release de-
terred President Lincoln from enforcing a suspension of the habeas
corpus privilege and the trial of civilians before military tribunals. 59
On July 4, 1861, Lincoln requested Congress's endorsement of his
prior conduct.60 Lincoln argued that because Congress was not in ses-
sion when the need to suspend habeas corpus arose, he was forced to
"act on his own to protect the nation. ' 61 On August 6, 1861, in re-
sponse to the President's request, Congress "retroactively approved
'all the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President ... respecting
the army and navy of the United States." 62 In addition, Congress
passed the Habeas Corpus Act on March 3, 1863, which provided the
President authority to suspend habeas corpus whenever he deter-
mined public safety required it.63
53. See id. at 1229.
54. See id. at 1230. Taney declared that "(1) only Congress has the right to suspend the privi-
lege of habeas corpus; and (2) the President exceeded his war powers." Id. (citing DONALD P.
KOMMERS & JOHN E. FINN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ESSAYS, CASES, AND COMPARA-
TIVE NOTES 291 (1988)).
55. Id.
56. Id. While the Constitution does not expressly state who has the authority to suspend
habeas corpus, Taney argued that placement of the provision (art. I, § 9, cl. 2) within Article I
assumed only a congressional act could authorize a suspension. See French, supra note 45, at
1230.
57. See French, supra note 45, at 1231. Taney asserted that the military had no right to arrest
and detain an individual, unless he was subject to the rules and articles of war, for an offense
against the laws of the United States. Id. at 1230. If a military officer arrested such an individ-
ual, he was to turn him over to a civilian court. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See French, supra note 45, at 1230.
61. Id. at 1231.
62. Id. at 1232 (quoting PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAK-
ING: CASES AND MATERIALS 222 (4th ed. 2000)).
63. Id.
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b. Ex parte Milligan64
It was not until after Lincoln's death and the conclusion of the Civil
War that the Supreme Court was able to address the constitutionality
of Lincoln's military commissions and suspension of habeas corpus.65
In Ex parte Milligan, the Supreme Court addressed both issues.
Lamdin Milligan was arrested in Indiana and tried before a military
commission for "conspiring against the United States by planning to
seize weapons, free Confederate prisoners, and kidnap the governor
of Indiana. '66 Milligan filed a habeas corpus petition "challenging the
jurisdiction of the military commission to try him."'67 In Milligan, the
Court first stated, "despite Congress's ratification of Lincoln's military
order suspending habeas corpus, the federal courts had jurisdiction to
hear a writ of habeas corpus to determine the validity of the military
commission's jurisdiction. '68
The Court next addressed whether the government could create
military commissions for the trial of civilians accused of committing
civil crimes because they posed an "immediate danger to the coun-
try."'69 Justice David Davis, writing for the majority, recognized that
during emergencies, the government needs the ability to detain per-
sons threatening the country's safety.70 Nevertheless, the Court reaf-
firmed Merryman, stating that emergency and war do not justify the
military trial of a civilian if federal civil courts are open to hear the
criminal accusations. 71 Moreover, the Court noted that "times of war
are times when the Court is most compelled to protect constitutional
civil liberties.' '72 The Court ultimately allowed for the trial of civilians
by military commission, but limited the ruling's scope. 73 Milligan gave
military commissions jurisdiction over a civilian accused of committing
a civil crime74 when civil courts were closed.75 It was not until the
64. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
65. Id. at 2.
66. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 593.
67. French, supra note 45, at 1231.
68. Id. at 1232. "Consequently, the Supreme Court could review whether a military commis-
sion had jurisdiction over Milligan." Id.
69. Id. at 1233.
70. Id.
71. Id. The Court determined that the military trial of civilians would only be appropriate if
the civil courts were closed. See French, supra note 45, at 1233. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1863
expressly stated that "as long as civil courts were open, the military was required to cede jurisdic-
tion over civilians whom it had arrested to the civil courts." Id. (citing Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
at 131).
72. French, supra note 45, at 1234.
73. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942).




Second World War that the Court would consider the authority of a
military commission to hear cases involving enemy combatants. 76
2. Roosevelt's Reaction to Nazi Saboteurs: Ex parte Quirin77
In Ex Parte Quirin, the United States Supreme Court discussed at
length the detainment and trial of enemy combatants by a military
commission. 78 Ultimately, the Court set forth a definition of enemy
combatant 79 that focused on the element of deceit relied upon by ear-
lier military commissions.80
a. The Facts of Quirin
Quirin arose amid World War II, when seven German-born individ-
uals living in the United States returned to Germany between 1933
and 194181 for training in explosives and secret writing at a sabotage
school outside of Berlin.8 2 All but one of these individuals admitted
citizenship to the German Reich.83 An officer of the High German
Command gave each individual orders to destroy United States war
industries and facilities. 84 After they received their instructions, all
seven men returned to varied locations within the United States,85
armed with explosives, fuses, and incendiary timing devices. 86 All in-
dividuals wore articles of clothing bearing the symbol of the German
Reich, which they removed and buried upon arrival to the United
76. See infra notes 77-124 and accompanying text.
77. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
78. Id.
79. The Quirin Court makes frequent use of the term "enemy belligerent." The terms "en-
emy belligerent," "unlawful combatant," and "enemy combatant" describe the same group of
individuals. Even though the Quirin Court never used the term "enemy combatant," the term
could be used interchangeably with those actually used.
80. See supra note 44.
81. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20. These individuals include Richard Quirin, Herbert Hans Haupt,
Edward John Kerling, Ernest Peter Burger, Heinreich Harm Heinck, Werner Thiel, and Herman
Otto Neubauer. Id. at 7.
82. Id.
83. Id. Herbert Haupt came to America when he was five years old and became a citizen of
the United States "by virtue of the naturalization of his parents during his minority." Id.
84. Id. at 8. Either these individuals or their relatives were to receive salary payments upon
completion of their objectives. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 8.
85. Id. It is understood that Burger, Heinck, and Quirin, with a German citizen named Dasch,
arrived along the coast of Amagansett Beach in Long Island, New York in a German submarine
during the evening of June 30, 1942. Kerling, Thiel, Neubauer, and Haupt arrived on the coast of
Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida, on June 17, 1942, and thereafter went to several locations through-
out the United States. Id.
86. Id.
840 [Vol. 53:831
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States.87 Soon thereafter, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion took all of the men into custody in Chicago and New York.88
Subsequent to the individuals' detainment, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt appointed a military commission to try the accused for of-
fenses against the law of war and the Articles of War.8 9 The ap-
pointed commission was formed pursuant to the Order of July 2, 1942
(July Order). 90 The July Order stated in clear terms that any individ-
ual subject to it was denied access to any other court.91 The individu-
als were subsequently turned over to Provost Marshal Albert Cox, of
the Military District of Washington, to be held for trial before the
Commission. 92
On July 2, 1942, the American government charged the German
men with violations of the law of war,93 Articles 8194 and 8295 of the
Articles of War, and conspiracy to commit each offense. 96 The men
petitioned for leave to file a writ of habeas corpus, which the district
court denied. 97 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia affirmed the lower court's denial. 98 The men then peti-
tioned the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.99
87. Id. Some individuals wore parts of German Marine Infantry uniforms, while others wore
caps. Id. It appears from this behavior that these men were familiar with the rules of law. Had
the men been captured immediately upon their arrival and not been wearing their uniforms, they
would have been in violation of the laws of war. For this reason, it appears that the men re-
mained in military clothing until after their risky arrival upon American soil was complete.
88. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 8.
89. Id.
90. Id. This Order not only directed the commission to try the individuals, but it also set up
regulations for the procedure of the trial and for review of the record of the trial and any judg-
ment of the commission. Id. It said in pertinent part:
All persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with the United
States or who give obedience to or act under the direction of any such nation, and who
during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United States ... through coastal or
boundary defenses, and are charged with committing or attempting to commit sabo-
tage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law of war, shall be subject
to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals.
Id.
91. Id.
92. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 8.
93. Id.
94. Id. See 82nd Articles of War, 10 U.S.C. § 1471-1593 (1946) (repealed 1950) Article 81
(defining the offense of relieving or attempting to relieve, or corresponding with or giving intelli-
gence to, the enemy).
95. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 8. See 82nd Articles of War, supra note 94, Article 82 (defining the
offense of spying).
96. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 8.
97. Id. at 9.
98. Id.
99. Id. The Supreme Court, citing Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), determined it
had jurisdiction to hear the writ because the denial by the district court allowed for leave to file
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b. Roosevelt's Authority for the Establishment of Military
Commissions
The Supreme Court set out to determine whether the Constitution,
or other laws of the United States, forbade the trial of petitioners
before a military commission. The petitioners contended that the
President had neither statutory nor constitutional authority to order a
trial by military tribunal for the offenses with which they were
charged; therefore, they were entitled to a trial in civilian courts under
the protection of the United States Constitution. 100 In the alternative,
the petitioners argued that the July Order conflicted with several pro-
visions of the Articles of War adopted by Congress. 10 1 The Govern-
ment, in response to petitioners' contentions, argued that the
petitioners should be denied access to the civil courts of the United
States because they entered American territory as enemy belligerents,
conduct for which the Articles of War authorized the President to cre-
ate military commissions. 10 2
The Court reviewed the constitutional powers bestowed upon Con-
gress and the President, paying close attention to Congress's ability to
make any law necessary and proper to provide for the common de-
fense.10 3 The Court explained that the drafters intended this power to
aid Congress in effectively upholding a core objective of the Constitu-
tion-to provide for the common defense.104 The Court further dis-
the habeas corpus petition. This constituted a judicial determination of a case or controversy,
which is thereby reviewable on appeal to the court of appeals and therefore reviewable to the
Supreme Court by certiorari. Id. In addition, the Court stated, "neither the Proclamation nor
the fact that they are enemy aliens forecloses consideration by the courts of petitioners' conten-
tions that the Constitution and laws of the United States constitutionally enacted forbid their
trial by military commission." Id. at 25.
100. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25. In particular, the petitioners asserted their right to a trial by jury,
guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, to all persons charged in civilian courts with
criminal offenses. Id.
101. Id. The provisions alleged to be in conflict with Roosevelt's July Order included Articles
38, 43. 46, 50 1/2 and 70. Id.
102. Id. The government urged the petitioners' character and conduct was identical to that
which the President's proclamation described as limited to trial before a military commission.
Id. The Government therefore contended that if the petitioners were found to be enemy bel-
ligerents and the President's proclamation was enforceable, the petitioners should be denied
access to such courts. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25.
103. Id. at 26. Article I, Section 8, clause 18 of the Constitution, states in full that Congress
has the power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for the carrying into Exe-
cution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." (emphasis added). Of the fore-
going powers referred to by this clause is Article I, Section 8, clause 1 of the Constitution, which
gives Congress the power to "provide for the common Defense." Id. By inference, Congress is
given the power to make any necessary and proper law to provide for this common defense.
104. Id.
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cussed the duties of the President as "carrying into effect all laws
passed by Congress for the conduct of war ... and all laws defining
and punishing offences against the law of nations, including those
which pertain to the conduct of war.' u0 5
The Articles of War, 106 implemented by Congress, provided for trial
and punishment of Army personnel and specified individuals associ-
ated with the Army by court martial. 10 7 .Furthermore, the Court
found the Articles of War recognized military commissions, appointed
by military command, as an appropriate forum for the trial of offenses
against the law of war not ordinarily tried by courts martial. 108 The
President, with certain limitations, had the power to determine and
implement the procedure for trial before such military commis-
sions.10 9 The Court found that the sanctioning of jurisdiction onto
military tribunals for offenses against the law of war was an appropri-
ate exercise of Congress's constitutionally limited authority to define
and punish such offenses. 1'0 It also found Roosevelt's order creating
the commission was an appropriate exercise of his authority.111
c. Unlawful Belligerent Defined: The Jurisdictional Scope of
Military Commissions
Once the Court determined that Roosevelt had authority to estab-
lish military commissions, it considered their permissible jurisdictional
scope.11 2 The Court set out to determine who these commissions
could try and who they could not'1 3 by acknowledging an appropriate
difference in treatment between captured lawful and unlawful com-
105. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. If, §1, cl. 1).
106. See 82nd Articles of War, supra note 94, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593 (1946) (repealed 1950).
107. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27 (citing Articles 1 and 2 of the 82nd Articles of War).
108. Id. The Court cited 10 U.S.C. § 1483 (Article 12) and 10 U.S.C. § 1486 (Article 15).
Article 15 allows for concurrent jurisdiction of courts martial, military commissions, and all other
military tribunals of "offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be triable by
such military commissions." Id. Article 12 provides that jurisdiction is not limited to military
personnel, but includes "any ... person who by the law of war is subject to trial by military
tribunals..." Id. The Court also said that it was not necessary for Congress to have listed the
exact offenders or offenses subject to trial by military commissions because Congress incorpo-
rated all offeises by reference to the laws of war. Id. at 30.
109. Id. at 28 (citing Articles 38 and 46 of the 82nd Articles of War).
110. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28.
111. Id.
112. See French, supra note 45, at 1240.
113. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29-30.
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batants.114 The Court distinguished between the lawful and unlawful
combatants as follows:
The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines
of a belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military informa-
tion and communicate it to the enemy, or an enemy combatant who
without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of
waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples
of belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the
status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law of war
subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals.115
The Court noted a distinction in the treatment of enemies as early as
the Civil War. 116 It further distinguished belligerents on the basis of
identification in the 1940 Rules of Land Warfare promulgated for the
guidance of the Army by the War Department.1 17 These findings led
the Court to interpret Article 15 of the Articles of War as Congress's
express provision permitting the trial and punishment of unlawful
belligerents. 118
d. The Court's Ruling
In concluding that military commissions had jurisdiction over the
petitioners, the Court focused on their conduct. The Court empha-
sized the fact that the petitioners discarded all identifying clothing
upon their entrance into the United States, while acting for a belliger-
ent enemy nation.1 19 In response to petitioners' constitutional claims,
114. Id. A lawful combatant is subject to capture and detention as a prisoner of war, whereas
the unlawful combatant is subject to capture and detention, but is subject to trial and punish-
ment by military tribunals. Id. at 31.
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Id. The Court pointed to General Order No. 100, para. 83 (Apr. 24, 1863), which di-
rected, "Scouts or single soldiers, if disguised in the dress of the country, or in the uniform of the
army hostile to their own, employed in obtaining information, if found within or lurking about
the lines of the captor, are treated as spies, and suffer death," and para. 84, which stated,
"Armed Prowlers, by whatever names they be called ... are not entitled to the privileges of the
prisoner of war." Id. at 32-33.
117. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 32-33. Paragraph 9 of the Rules names the carrying of open arms and
a fixed distinctive emblem as distinguishing characteristics of lawful belligerents. Id. Paragraph
348 states that "persons who take up arms and commit hostilities without having the means of
identification prescribed for belligerents are punishable as 'war criminals."' Furthermore, the
definition in paragraph nine of lawful belligerent was adopted by Article 1, Annex to Hague
Convention No. IV of October 18, 1907, to which the United States was a signatory.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 37. The Court described any action aimed at the destruction of any property used
or useful in prosecuting war as war-like, thereby broadening the commission of punishable con-
duct beyond action aimed at the Armed Forces of the United States. Id. The Court further
identified the petitioners' entrance into the United States as a hostile war-like act in and of itself:
Nor are petitioners any the less belligerents if, as they argue, they have not actually
committed or attempted to commit any act of depredation or entered the theatre or
[Vol. 53:831
2003] A LEGAL WAR ON TERRORISM 845
the Court looked to the era in which the Constitution was adopted
and found such rights unrecognized by military tribunals; 120 therefore,
it determined such rights to be outside the protection of such provi-
sions.' 21 The Court concluded that the petitioners' conduct consti-
tuted a violation of the law of war in such a manner as to make the
petitioners unlawful belligerents, thus subjecting them to trial by a
military tribunal without the protection of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.122
The Court also ruled, "citizenship in the United States of an enemy
belligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of a belliger-
ency which is unlawful because in violation of the law of war."'123
Thus, according to the Supreme Court in Quirin, both citizens and
aliens are subject to military commissions when they violate the law of
war.
124
Most importantly, the Court noted that Roosevelt's reliance on the
Articles of War in his July Order confined the military commissions he
zone of active military operations .... The offense was complete when with that pur-
pose they entered-or, having so entered, they remained upon-our territory in time of
war without uniform or other appropriate means of identification.
Id. at 31.
120. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31. The Court did not consider military tribunals "courts" as set forth
in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933)
(stating that Article III, Section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution, using the term "all" in some cases
and omitting it in others, when enumerating cases where judicial power shall extend, cannot be
regarded as accidental because every word in the Constitution must be given its due force and
appropriate meaning). The Court interpreted the intention of the Framers of Article III, Section
2 of the Constitution as attempting to preserve the unimpaired right to a trial by jury existent in
the common law, rather than including cases that were understood at the time not to include
such a right. Quirin 317 U.S. at 39.
121. Id. at 40. The Court stated:
We must conclude that § 2 of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments cannot
be taken to have extended the right to demand a jury to trials by military commission,
or to have required that offenses against the law of war not triable by a jury at common
law be tried only in the civil courts.
Id. at 40. Further support for the contemporary exclusion of military tribunals from the rights
set forth in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution is drawn from Section 2 of the Act of
Congress of April 10, 1806, derived from the Resolution of the Continental Congress of August
21, 1776, which "imposed the death penalty on alien spies 'according to the law and usage of
nations, by sentence of a general court martial."' Id. at 41. The resolution of 1776 displays a
willingness to subject non-military individuals to trial before a military commission without pro-
viding them with similar rights as individuals appearing in a civilian court.
122. Id. at 45. However, it is important to note that while some of the defendant's constitu-
tional rights were precluded, they were allowed to confer with and retain attorneys. See French,
supra note 45, at 1238.
123. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37. The Court explained that "citizens who associate themselves with
the military arm of the enemy government, and .. .enter this country bent of hostile acts are
enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war." Id.
124. See French, supra note 45, at 1243.
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created to the jurisdictional scope provided for within the Articles of
War. 125 Specifically, the commissions only had jurisdiction.over indi-
viduals whose conduct fit the "unlawful belligerent" definition. 126
Therefore, the jurisdiction was limited to the trial of spies who passed
military lines without uniform.127
B. The Current Use of Enemy Combatant Designations:
Congress and the President Respond to al Qaeda
The Milligan and Quirin Courts set forth narrow rules recognizing
the ability of the President, with Congressional authorization, to cre-
ate military commissions for the trial of individuals in limited circum-
stances. 128 In response to the treacherous acts of September 11, 2001,
President Bush relied on Roosevelt's conduct 129 and the decision set
forth in Quirin to assert his authority in establishing military commis-
sions for the trial of suspected terrorists. 130 This section presents the
legislative and executive responses to these recent attacks on
America.
1. Public Law 107-40 (PL 107-40)
On September 18, 2001, the Senate and House of Representatives
passed a joint resolution authorizing the use of military force against
those responsible for the attacks of September 11.131 Congress's stated
purpose was to protect United States citizens from further threats
against America's national security. 132 The resolution authorized
President Bush to use "all necessary and appropriate force against
125. Id. at 1242.
126. Id. The Court noted the possibility that an individual might violate the law of war with-
out becoming an unlawful belligerent, thereby entitling him to trial by courts martial or a civilian
court. Id.
127. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 74-77, 119-127 and accompanying text.
129. On November 19, 2001, Bush said, "I would remind those who don't understand the
decision I made [to establish military commissions] that Franklin Roosevelt made the same deci-
sion in World War II. Those were extraordinary times as well." See French, supra note 45, at
1244 n.95.
130. Id. at 1243.
131. Pub. L. No. 107-40, Authorization for Use of Military Force (Sept. 18, 2001) [hereinafter
PL 107-40].
132. Id. Congress founded its authority for passing this resolution on Article I, Section 8,
clause 18 of the Constitution, stating, "Whereas, such acts render it both necessary and appropri-
ate that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United States citizens
both at home and abroad .... Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America .in Congress assembled." The Constitutional
power relied upon by this 107th Congress closely echoes the rationale relied upon by the Quirin
Court in acknowledging both the power of Congress and the President to provide for the com-
mon defense. See supra note 103.
846
2003] A LEGAL WAR ON TERRORISM
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, au-
thorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001... in order to prevent future acts of international
terrorism against the United States....
2. Detention, Treatment of Certain Noncitizens in the War Against
Terrorism
On November 13, 2001, in reliance on PL 107-40, President Bush
ordered the detention, treatment, and trial of several noncitizens sus-
pected of having ties to terrorist nations or organizations (November
Order). 34 The President rested his authority not only on PL 107-40,
but also on the Constitution 135 and 10 U.S.C. §§ 821136 and 836.137
The November Order recognized the ability and intention of terror-
ist cells to attack the United States again.138 In an effort to protect the
United States and its citizens from further attacks, President Bush or-
dered all individuals subject to the November Order be detained and
tried before military commissions. 139 In addition, President Bush de-
nied the detainees the right to several general principles of law and
rules of evidence recognized in civilian courts.140
133. PL 107-40, supra note 131.
134. See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terror-
ism, Order of November 13, 2001 by President George Walker Bush November Order. See
supra note 24.
135. Id. Bush relied upon Article II, Section 1, clause 1 of the Constitution, the same clause
on which the Quirin court premised Roosevelt's constitutional authority. See supra note 105.
136. Id. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (1956). (Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial Not Exclusive): This provi-
sion confers concurrent jurisdiction on military commissions, provost courts, courts martial, and
all other military tribunals with respect to "offenders and offenses that by statute or by the law
of war may be tried in military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals." It
closely echoes Article 15 of the 82nd Articles of War which was relied on in Quirin. See supra
note 108.
137. Id. 10 U.S.C. § 836 (President May Prescribe Rules). This provision authorizes the Presi-
dent to prescribe all pretrial, trial and post-trial procedures for cases triable by courts martial,
military commissions and other military tribunals. The provision closely echoes Articles 38 and
46 of the 82nd Articles of War, which was relied on in Quirin, See supra note 109 and accompa-
nying text.
138. Id. § 1(c). "Individuals acting alone and in concert involved in international terrorism
possess both the capability and the intention to undertake further terrorist attacks on the United
States." Id.
139. Id. § 1(e). "[T]o protect the United States and its citizens, and for the effective conduct
of military operations and prevention of terrorist attacks, it is necessary for individuals subject to
this order ... to be detained, and ... tried for violations of the laws of war and other applicable
laws by military tribunals." Id.
140. Id. § 1(f). For a more complete list of the rights afforded individuals subject to the No-
vember 13 Order, see infra notes 148-161 and accompanying text.
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III. ANALYSIS
President Bush's Military Order has sparked a great deal of criti-
cism within the legal community. 141 Many critics assert that Bush has
overstepped his authority as Commander in Chief, thereby violating
the fundamental doctrine of Separation of Powers. 142 Others criticize
his order as an "unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental liber-
ties. ' 143 This section evaluates President Bush's current application of
the enemy combatant designation and its consequences. Part A
briefly discusses the consequences of being labeled as an enemy com-
batant today based on the Department of Defense Military Commis-
sion Order.1 44 Part B contrasts the government's arrest and
detainment of several suspected terrorists subsequent to September
11, 2001. Part C attempts to determine whether President Bush's ac-
tions were within his authority or a display of the most recent example
of government overreaction to the threat of national security. t45
In addition to evaluating President Bush's use of the enemy com-
batant label, this section proposes that President Bush either commit
himself to a constitutional definition of "enemy combatant" or find an
alternative solution to protecting the public.1 46 Part D suggests, as an
alternative to the enemy combatant label, the Bush Administration
prosecute all suspected terrorists in civilian courts and argue for an
141. See Stephen 1. Vladeck, A Small Problem of Precedent, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) and the De-
tention of U.S. Citizen "Enemy Combatants," 112 YALE L.J. 961 (2003) (arguing President Bush's
current policy of detaining enemy combatants violates 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)); see also Rankin,
infra note 142 and French, supra note 45.
142. See Vladeck, supra note 141 (concluding that the detainment of enemy combatants vio-
lates 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) and results in a disregard of the doctrine of separation of powers);
French, supra note 45, at 1227; and Bill Rankin, Suspect's Detainment Scrutinized; GSU Students
Told U.S. Prisoner's Designation Wrong, ATLANrA J. & CoNsT., Nov. 16, 2002, at C.2 (quoting
Jose Padilla's attorneys, who said "the designation of... Padilla as an 'enemy combatant' has
more to do with testing the limits of presidential power than it does the detention of a would-be
terrorist").
143. French, supra note 45, at 1227; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Letter to the Editor, Military
Tribunals: Too Broad a Power, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at A30; Takei, supra note 19 (compar-
ing the detainment of enemy combatants to improper detainment of Japanese-Americans during
World War II); Jonathan Turley, Ashcroft's Law West and East of the Pecos; He is Arbitrarily
Deciding Who can be Tried Where, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2002, at B13 (criticizing Ashcroft's
arbitrary determination of who is subject to trial before a military commission); and America's
'Enemy Combatants', ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Nov. 1, 2002, at A16 (saying that the
enemy combatant designation of Yaser Hamdi "summarily stripped him of his rights, as an
American, to legal representation and due process").
144. See infra notes 149-163 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 239-260 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 243-251, 271-298 and accompanying text.
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extension of the "public safety exception" set forth in New York v.
Quarles.147
A. Current Consequences of the Enemy Combatant Designation
Today, when President Bush labels an individual an enemy combat-
ant, a military commission is created to determine his guilt or inno-
cence. 148 This individual no longer has a right to be tried before a
civilian court with the full protection of the Constitution. Rather, an
enemy combatant tried before a military commission is given rights as
determined by the President and Department of Defense. 149
1. Restricted Right to Counsel
By order of the Department of Defense, military officers who are
judge advocates of any United States armed force are assigned as de-
fense counsel for an accused enemy combatant. 150 A defendant may
select a military officer as his counsel or may elect to retain the ser-
vices of a civilian attorney, provided the attorney meets the require-
ments set forth by the Commission Order.151 The hiring of civilian
counsel, however, does not guarantee his or her presence at all points
throughout the proceedings.152 The government rejected habeas peti-
tions to allow individuals unfettered access to private counsel on the
grounds that President Bush, as Commander in Chief, determined the
accused to be enemy combatants.1 53
147. See infra notes 289-298 and accompanying text.
148. See infra notes 288-298 and accompanying text. The Quirin Court acknowledged the
power of the President as Commander-in-Chief to create commission through authority granted
by Congress and the Constitution. See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
149. Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002) [hereinafter
Commission Order]. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, by order of the President, issued
orders and regulations concerning the creation and use of military commissions for the trial of
enemy combatants.
150. Id. § 4(C)(1)-(2).
151. Id. § 4(C)(3). Section 4(C)(3)(b) requires that a civilian attorney: (1) be a United States
citizen; (2) be admitted to the practice of law in a State, district, territory or possession of the
United States; (3) not be subject to any disciplinary action or sanction by any court or govern-
mental authority; (4) be eligible for access to information classified at the level of "secret" or
higher; and (5) sign a written agreement to comply with all applicable regulations or instructions
of counsel. Id.
152. Id. § 4(C)(3)(b). "The qualification of a Civilian Defense Counsel does not guarantee
that person's presence at closed Commission proceedings or that persons access to any informa-
tion protected under Section 6(D)(5)." Id.
153. Sean D. Murphy, U.S. Nationals Detained as Unlawful Combatants, 96 AM. J. IrNr'L L.
956, 981 (Oct. 2002). In remanding a district court order mandating access to counsel for Yaser
Esam Hamdi, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
The order arises in the context of foreign relations and national security, where a
court's deference to the political branches of our national government is considerable.
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2. Limitations at Trial
Individuals subject to a military commission are not tried before a
jury, but before appointed officers of the United States armed
forces. 154 Members of the commission are charged with the duty of
providing a full and fair trial, 155 and safeguards similar to those in a
civilian criminal trial are imposed. 156 However, Section 6(D) of the
Commission Order, detailing the use of evidence during trial, allows
the government to withhold evidence from the defense on essentially
an ad hoc basis, thereby preventing a fair trial from actually taking
place. 157 In addition, the Commission Order essentially removes a de-
fendant's right against compelled self-incrimination prior to trial.'5 8
3. Restrictions of Right to Judicial Review
Unlike typical criminal cases, an enemy combatant may not seek
review of the military commission's decision by an appellate court. 159
Rather, the Secretary of Defense designates a panel of three military
officers or civilians to review the commission's trial record. 160 After
the Review Panel has made its decisions and recommendations to the
It is the President who wields "delicate, plenary and exclusive power ... as the sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations-a power which
does not require a basis for its exercise an act of Congress." And where as here the
President does act with statutory authorization from Congress, there is all the more
reason for deference.
Id. at 981.
However, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that
enemy combatant Jose Padilla should be given the right to speak to an attorney for the limited
purpose of dealing with a habeas petition. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d. 564 (S.D.N.Y 2002)
(citing United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).
154. Commission Order, supra note 149, § 4(A). Each commission will be comprised of three
to seven members. Id. § 4(A)(2).
155. Id. § 6(B)(1).
156. Id. § 5.
157. Id. § 6(D)(5)(a)-(c). The presiding officer may issue protective orders to safeguard "pro-
tected information" and limit its disclosure to defense counsel by deleting it from documents,
substituting a portion of the documents with summaries of the protected information, or even
closing off proceedings to civilian defense counsel. Id. Section 9 of the Commission Order gives
great breadth to Section 6(D)(5), which states, "Nothing in this Order shall be construed to
authorize disclosure of state secrets to any person not authorized to receive them." Commission
Order, supra note 149, § 6(D)(5)(a)-(c).
158. Id. § 5(F). "The Accused shall not be required to testify during trial. A Commission
shall draw no adverse inference from an Accused's decision not to testify. This subsection shall
not preclude admission of evidence of prior statements or conduct of the Accused." Id. (emphasis
added). This provision explicitly removes the right of an individual, implied by the Fifth Amend-
ment, to prevent law enforcement officers form coercing self-incriminating statements from him.
159. Id. § 6(H).
160. Id. § 6(H)(4). The Order requires that at least one member of the Review Panel have
experience as a judge. Id. The Review Panel is charged with the duty of reviewing the written
record of trial and either returning the case to the Appointing Authority for further proceedings
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Secretary of Defense, the President has authority to make the final
decision on any conviction or sentence. 161
4. Indefinite Confinement
One of the most severe consequences of being labeled an enemy
combatant is the individual's potential for indefinite confinement.' 6
2
When the President determines that an individual is an enemy com-
batant, apparently the government can place him in a military camp
indefinitely. 163
B. The Enemies: Today's Use of Enemy Combatant Designations
Subsequent to the attacks on September 11, the government ar-
rested and detained hundreds of suspected terrorists, several of whom
are American citizens.1 64 Of the currently detained Americans, some
are charged with crimes in federal district courts,1 65 while others are
designated enemy combatants, detained indefinitely with no charges
brought against them. President Bush's November Order specifically
deals with non-American citizens. 166 He has made no similar order
for citizens of the United States. This section presents profiles of sev-
eral individuals suspected of supporting al Qaeda in taking arms
against America and our government's response to each.
(due to a majority finding of material error of law), or forwarding the case to the Secretary of
Defense with a recommendation as to disposition. Commission Order, supra note 149 § 6(H)(4).
161. November Order, supra note 24, § 4(c)(8). This section of the military order also autho-
rizes the President to designate the Secretary of Defense with the authority to make a final
decision. Commission Order, supra note 149, § 6(H)(4).
162. "It has long been established that if Hamdi is indeed an 'enemy combatant' who was
captured during hostilities in Afghanistan, the government's present detainment of him is a law-
ful one." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S.
at 25-26). It appears that these men might be able to challenge their confinement through
habeas corpus petitions, but this has proved difficult. Hamdi has been unable to file a petition
on his own behalf, and his attorney was unable to file a petition as his "next friend" because no
"preexisting relationship" existed between the two. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 576
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). See supra note 24. In Padilla's case, however, the court allowed his attorney to
act as his next friend in order to file a habeas corpus petition. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 575-79.
Ultimately, Judge Mukasey determined the applicable test in determining the lawfulness of an
enemy combatant's detention is whether "some evidence" supports the designation and found
Padilla's detention to be appropriate under the given circumstances. Id. at 587-97.
163. See discussion on detainment of Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla, infra notes 190-238 and
accompanying text.
164. "The government recently disclosed that, since September lth, it detained a total of 571
individuals on immigration violations, and 74 people were still being held in INS custody as of
June 13, 2002." Sonnett, et al., supra note 22 (citing Center for National Security Studies v.
United States Dept. of Justice. Case No. 01-2500 (Slip. Op. at p. 7)).
165. See infra notes 167-189 and accompanying text.
166. November Order, supra note 24, § 2(a). "The term 'individual subject to this order' shall
mean any individual who is not a United States citizen ..... Id.
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1. John Phillip Walker Lindh
On November 24, 2001, Northern Alliance troops captured John
Walker Lindh, an American-born citizen and resident of California,
after a prison uprising among Taliban fighters outside of Mazar-e-
Sharif.167 Walker was charged in a ten-count indictment for, inter alia,
conspiring to murder Americans abroad. 168 Prior to being charged,
Walker remained in United States military custody. He had no rights
of an American citizen or a traditional prisoner of war.169 While in
captivity, military officials frequently interrogated Walker without the
aid of counsel.'70 He eventually admitted involvement with al
Qaeda.171 The government classified Walker as a "battlefield de-
tainee,"1 72 which assumedly gave the military a right to interrogate
him without a lawyer present. 173 However, charges were eventually
brought against Walker in civilian court.174 Walker pled guilty to sup-
plying services to the Taliban and carrying explosives during commis-
sion of a felony on July 15, 2002175 as part of a plea bargain with the
government. 176 In this plea bargain, the United States promised not
to treat Walker as an enemy combatant. 177 Due to his cooperation,
Walker received a sentence of only twenty years in prison.178
167. See Proffer of Facts in Support of Defendant's Suppression Motions at 3-5, United States
v. Lindh (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37-A). See also Jim Puzzanghera, The Case of 'Taliban John
Treason Among Options for Charging American, SEATTLE TIMEs, Dec. 20, 2001, at A3.
168. Toni Locy, Court Hearing Begins on Use of Lindh Statements, USA TODAY, July 15, 2002,
at A.07.
169. Puzzanghera, supra note 167. Walker was first held in Kandahar, at U.S. Marines Camp
Rhino, and was transferred to the USS Peleliu in the Arabian Sea. Id.
170. Locy, supra note 168. These interrogations took place over six sessions from November
25, 2001, to December 10, 2001. Id. During this time, Walker admitted he trained at an al
Qaeda terrorist camp, met with Osama bin Laden and learned of several followers who were
sent to the United States on suicide missions prior to September 11, 2001. Id.
171. Id.
172. Puzzanghera, supra note 167 at A3. "[White House Press Secretary Ari] Fleischer and
administration officials are careful not to call him a prisoner of war. Such a designation would
set in place a series of protections under the international convention." Id. The term "battle-
field detainee" is not a term found in military law; rather, it is a description used to avoid the
implications of labeling an individual and prisoner of war or an American citizen tried in civilian
court, which would include the right to an attorney. Id.
173. Id.
174. Martha Neil, Avoiding the 'Enemy Combatant' Label, 1 No. 27 ABA J. E-REPORT, July
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2. The "Buffalo Six"
The government accused six men 179 from Lackawanna, New York-
American citizens of Yemeni descent-of attending an Islamic ex-
tremist camp in Afghanistan in 2001.180 On October 22, 2002, the gov-
ernment charged these men with conspiracy to provide material
support and resources to a foreign terrorist nation and with providing
material support to al Qaeda' 8 under the Anti-Terrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996.182 The Act gave the federal court in
Buffalo jurisdiction over the case, thereby allowing the men an oppor-
tunity to retain and speak with counsel. The men appeared in United
States District Court on October 23, 2002, and pled not guilty to all
felony counts.'8 3
3. The "Portland Six"
In October 2002, the government indicted a group of six individuals,
five of whom were American citizens, for their involvement with al
Qaeda. 84 The charges against the individuals included conspiracy to
levy war against the United States, conspiracy to provide material sup-
port and resources to al Qaeda, conspiracy to contribute services to al
Qaeda and the Taliban, and possession firearms in furtherance of
crimes of violence. 185 According to Attorney General John Ashcroft,
five of the individuals unsuccessfully attempted to enter Afghanistan
through China. 186 One of the individuals stayed behind and wired
money to the rest with knowledge that they would use it in an attempt
to reach Afghanistan to aid al Qaeda and the Taliban.'8 7 Unlike the
"Buffalo Six," none of the individuals involved in these indictments
179. Jim Memmott, Six in Terror Case Plead Not Guilty, DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (Rochester,
NY), Oct. 23, 2002, at 7A. These men included Sahim Alwan, Yasein Taher, Mukhtar al-Bakri.,
Yahya Goba, Shafal Mosed, and Faysal Galab.
180. Six in US Court Accused of Supporting al Qaeda, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, at P8. The
men were alleged to have attended an anti-American speech at the camp, given by Osama bin
Laden, thereby providing material support to and resources to al Qaeda. Memmott, supra note
179.
181. Memmott, supra note 179.
182. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132 (s 735)
[hereinafter 1996 Act].
183. Memmott, supra note 179.
184. Andrew Kramer, Six Indicted on Terror Charges, CENTRE DAILY TIMES, Oct. 5, 2002. Of
these individuals, three were arrested in Oregon, including Jeffrey Leon Battle, October Marti-
nique Lewis, and Patrice Lumumba Ford; Muhammad Bilal was arrested in Detroit; Ahmed
Bilal and Abdullah al Saub were being sought oversees. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.




made it to Afghanistan, thus creating skepticism over the govern-
ment's case.188 Also unlike the Buffalo Six, these individuals turned
to Osama bin Laden after the attacks of September 11 for unclear
motives.1 89
4. Yaser Esam Hamdi
The government took Yaser Esam Hamdi, an American citizen
born in Louisiana, into custody as an alleged enemy combatant during
military operations in Afghanistan. 190 The military initially took
Hamdi to Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo Bay before discovering his
American citizenship. 191 The government believed Hamdi possessed
vital information concerning terrorist plots against America and de-
tained him as an enemy combatant in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.192 On May 29, 2002, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, in a consolidated habeas petition
hearing, 193 ordered the government to allow Hamdi unmonitored ac-
cess to his attorney.1 94 On June 11, 2002, the district court appointed
Public Defender Frank Dunham as counsel for Hamdi, ordering the
government to allow Dunham unmonitored access to Hamdi. 195 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stayed the dis-
trict court's order pending appeal by the government. 196 On appeal,
the government classified Hamdi as an enemy combatant and con-
tended that he had no general rights under the Constitution to meet
188. Andrew Murr et al., The Portland Six; Joining Jihad; They Had Guns, and Plans for
Afghanistan. Busting a Would-be Cell, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 14, 2002, at 26.
189. Id.
190. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002). Hamdi's petition for writ of habeas
corpus to the Supreme Court stated that he was taken into custody in the fall of 2001 and trans-
ferred to Guantanamo Bay in January 2002. Id.
191. Id. It was discovered that Hamdi was born in Louisiana and may not have renounced his
citizenship, at which point he was transferred to the Norfolk Naval Station Brig in April 2002.
Id.
192. Id. at 279. Hamdi was still held at the military brig as of his Fourth Circuit petition
hearing in June 2002. Id.
193. Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 279. On May 10, 2002, the Federal Public Defender filed a habeas
petition naming Hamdi and himself as next best friend, which was consolidated with a separate
habeas petition filed by Christian Peregrim, a private citizen, on behalf of Hamdi. Id. Both of
these petitions were dismissed following the filing of a petition by Hamdi's father, Esam Fouad
Hamdi. Id. at 280. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that Hamdi's father
was a proper next friend. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, at 600 n.1 (4th Cir. 2002).
194. Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 280. This order was supported on June 11, 2002, when the district
court appointed the Public Defender as counsel for Hamdi based on a separate petition filed by
Hamdi's father. Id.
195. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003).
196. Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 281.
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with counsel. 19 7 On July 12, 2002, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the dis-
trict court's June 11 order and disagreed with its interpretation of
Hamdi's status.' 98 The court found that the President was best suited
for the task of determining who is an enemy combatant 99 and how to
deal with such an individual,200 regardless of his citizenship. 201 Subse-
quent to the Fourth Circuit's remand, the district court held a hearing
on July 18, 2002, asking, "[W]ith whom is the war I should suggest that
we're fighting?" The court further inquired, "[W]ill the war never be
over as long as there is any member [or] any person who might feel
that they want to attack the United States of America or [its citi-
zens]? '20 2 On July 25, 2002, the government responded to these ques-
tions in a motion to dismiss Hamdi's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.203 Attached to its motion was an affidavit from Michael
Mobbs, the Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy (Mobbs Declaration). 20 4  The Mobbs Declaration confirmed
the material factual allegations in Hamdi's petition and described the
circumstances around Hamdi's seizure and subsequent designation as
an enemy combatant. 20 5 On August 13, 2002, the district court held a
hearing to review the sufficiency of the Mobbs Declaration.20 6 The
court determined on August 16, 2002, that the Declaration "falls far
short" of supporting Hamdi's detention.20 7 The government thereaf-
ter filed a motion to certify the district court's August 16 order for
interlocutory appeal. 208 On review, the Fourth Circuit declared:
197. Id. at 282. The government asserted that Hamdi's capture on the battlefield in a foreign
land caused his "enemy combatant" status and relinquished any rights he would have in civilian
courts. Id. The Public Defender contended that Hamdi's status as an American citizen detained
within the United States differentiates him from aliens located outside of the United States and
therefore should allow him a right to counsel. Id.
198. Id. The court said, "[T]he June 11 order apparently assumes (1) that Hamdi is not an
enemy combatant or (2) even if he might be such a person, he is nonetheless entitled not only to
counsel, but to immediate and unmonitored access thereto." Id.
199. Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283.
200. Id. (citing AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE, Pub. L. No. 107-40115 Stat
224 (2001)).
201. Id. citing Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 17 (1942). The Fourth Circuit did not draw a distinction
between the terms "unlawful combatant" and "enemy combatant," thereby allowing for their
use interchangeably.




206. Id. at 462.
207. Id. In the district court's August 13 opinion, it ordered the government to turn over
copies of Hamdi's statements, the names and addresses of all interrogators who questioned him,
statements by the Northern Alliance regarding the circumstances of Hamdi's surrender, and a




[When] a habeas petitioner has been designated an enemy combat-
ant and it is undisputed that he was captured in a zone of active
combat operations abroad, further judicial inquiry is unwarranted
when the government has responded to the petition by setting forth
factual assertions which would establish a legally valid basis for the
petitioner's detention. 20 9
The Fourth Circuit held: 1) Hamdi's detention was authorized by Con-
gress; 2) Hamdi had no right under the Geneva Convention to deter-
mine his status as an enemy belligerent through a formal hearing; 3)
the district court's order conflicted with the constitutional war-making
powers of the President and Congress; and 4) the Mobbs Declaration
was sufficient to establish that Hamdi's detention conformed with the
legitimate exercise of the president's war powers. 210 The Court was
careful to limit its ruling to the specific facts in Hamdi's case, rejecting
"the summary embrace of 'a sweeping proposition-namely that with
no meaningful judicial review, any American citizen alleged to be an
enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely without charges or
counsel on the government's say-so." 21' Meanwhile, Hamdi is cur-
rently being held under military control as an enemy combatant. 212
5. Jose Padilla
Jose Padilla, also known as Abdullah al Muhajir, was detained at
O'Hare International Airport in Chicago, Illinois, on May 8, 2002,
pursuant to a material witness warrant. 21 3 On May 15, 2002, Padilla
appeared before the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, and Public Defender Donna Newman was ap-
pointed to represent him.21 4 On June 7, 2002, Padilla and Newman
209. Id. at 476.
210. Id. at 450.
211. Id. at 476 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002)). The Court
differentiates Hamdi's situation, that of "the undisputed detention of a citizen during combat
operation undertaken in a foreign country and a determination by the executive that the citizen
was allied with enemy forces," from that individuals captured on American soil. Id. It concludes
by saying, "Judicial review does not disappear during wartime, but the review of battlefield cap-
tures in overseas conflict is a highly deferential one." Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 476.
212. Richard A. Serrano, Judge Urged Not to Free Man as Combatant, L.A. TIMES, July 18,
2003, at A22. At the time this Comment's publication, the Fourth Circuit denied a rehearing en
banc. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003). Subsequently, on January 9. 2004, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 124 S. Ct. 981 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004) (No. 03-6696). Hamdi's case
will be heard by the Supreme Court on April 28, 2003. See http://supreme.lp.findlaw.comlsu-
premescourt/docket/2003/april.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
213. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d. 564, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York issued the warrant based on facts
provided in an affidavit by a special agent of the FBI that Padilla had information pertaining to
the September 11 attacks. Id. at 571.
214. Id.
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submitted a motion to vacate the warrant. 215 The government subse-
quently notified the district court, ex parte, that it would sign an order
vacating the warrant because on June 9, 2002, President Bush desig-
nated Padilla as an enemy combatant.2 16 The June 9 order grounded
President Bush's declaration of Padilla as an enemy combatant on the
following basis:
[He] is "closely associated with al Qaeda," engaged in "hostile and
war-like acts" including "preparation for acts of international ter-
rorism" directed at this country, possesses information that would
be helpful in preventing al Qaeda attacks, and represents "a contin-
uing, present and grave danger to the national security of the
United States. 217
At that time, the Department of Defense took Padilla into custody
and transferred him to a naval brig in Charleston, South Carolina.2 18
Padilla, an American-born citizen and resident of Chicago, was ac-
cused of collaborating with members of al Qaeda to build a radiologi-
cal bomb. 219 Newman filed a habeas corpus petition on behalf of
Padilla pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241.220 On December 4, 2002, district
court Judge Michael Mukasey ruled, inter alia, that Newman could act
as next friend for the purpose of challenging by habeas corpus petition
Padilla's detention as an unlawful combatant, that Secretary of De-
fense Donald Rumsfeld was a proper respondent in the case, that the
President had the power to direct that an American citizen captured
in the United States be detained as an unlawful combatant, and that
the President's determination would be sustained as to Padilla if the
court found, after hearing from Padilla, that there was some evidence
to support it.221 In his ruling, Judge Mukasey directed the government
to provide Padilla with limited access to counsel:
[Flor the purpose of submitting to the court facts bearing upon his
petition, under such conditions as the parties may agree to, or ab-
sent agreement, such conditions as the court may direct so as to
215. Id.
216. Id. The June 9 Order sets forth President Bush's findings with respect to Padilla. Id. at
572. President Bush relied in large part on a declaration by Michael H. Mobbs, an employee on
the Department of Defense, which Bush declared extremely confidential. Id. For more informa-
tion on the Mobbs Declarations, see supra note 204 and accompanying text.
217. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d 568 (quoting June 9 Order $1 2-5).
218. Id.
219. Frederick N. Egler, Jr., Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 4 No. 18 LAW. J. 4 (Sept. 6, 2002).
A bomb of this type is often referred to as a "dirty" bomb.
220. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 569. Newman filed this petition as Padilla's next friend. Id.
The court found Newman had standing to act as Padilla's next friend because she had a suffi-
ciently close pre-existing relationship with Padilla and Padilla was held incommunicado as an
enemy combatant. Id.
221. Id. at 564.
2003]
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foreclose, so far as possible, the danger that Padilla will use his at-
torneys for the purpose of conveying information to others .
222
Judge Mukasey carefully limited the purpose for providing Padilla
with access to counsel, stating, "no general right to counsel in connec-
tion with questioning has been hypothesized.., and thus the interfer-
ence with interrogation would be minimal or nonexistent. '22 3 In his
order, Judge Mukasey required the government's attorneys to meet
with Newman to establish the terms of her contact with Padilla.2 24 In
response, the government filed a motion for reconsideration in part,
asking Mukasey to re-evaluate his decision to provide Padilla with ac-
cess to counsel. 225 In support of its motion, the Government attached
a declaration by Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, Director of the De-
fense Intelligence Agency, which set forth the "factual predicate for
the government's motion. '226 With strong reservations, Mukasey
granted the government's motion. 227 In ruling on it, Mukasey de-
scribed the Jacoby Declaration as "speculative ' 228 and argued that
there are plausible scenarios, other than withholding access to coun-
sel, that would be "far more beneficial to the government than the
prospect of waiting while Padilla ... toughs it out for whatever period
of time he may think someone on the outside might help him." 229
222. Id. at 605.
223. Id. at 603.
224. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 605. This conference was to take place by December 30, 2002.
Id. On December 23, 2002, the Government submitted a letter to Judge Mukasey, requesting a
brief adjournment of the conference. Id. The letter also stated that the Government believed it
necessary to present the Court with additional factual information to enable the Court to assess
the feasibility of different conditions that the defense may propose in regards to Padilla's contact
with counsel. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 44-45 (S.D.N.Y. March 11, 2003) (citing
Letter of Bruce to the Court of 12/23/02, at 1). The Court granted an adjournment until January
8, 2003. Id. at 45.
225. Padilla, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 46.
226. Id. The Jacoby Declaration described, inter alia, the intelligence-gathering process and
the "importance of maintaining its continuity and integrity." Id. at 49. Further, the declaration
described the "interrogation techniques used by the [Defense Intelligence Agency], and its as-
sessment of the danger of interrupting such interrogation to permit Padilla to consult with coun-
sel." Id. The declaration stated, "Any insertion of counsel into the subject-interrogator
relationship, for example-even if only for a limited duration or for a specific purpose-can
undo months of work and may permanently shut down the interrogation process." Id. (citing
Jacoby Decl., at 4-5).
227. Padilla, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 44. Mukasey was hesitant in response to the Government's
motion because it was filed in violation of Local Civil Rule 6.3, which requires a motion for
reconsideration to be filed within ten days after the court's determination of the original mo-
tions. Id. The Government's motion was filed well after the deadline. However, he interpreted
the rule as a guide for what the court may do to protect itself rather than what a court must do in
every situation. Id. at 48. He granted the Government's motion to further stress his original
ruling. Id.
228. Id. at 52.
229. Id. at 53.
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Mukasey reiterated his belief that, even if the Jacoby Declaration was
reliable, Padilla had the right to present facts in connection with his
petition, and the only feasible way for him to do so was through a
lawyer.230 He stated, "Unless [Padilla] has the opportunity to make a
submission, this court cannot do what the applicable statutes and the
Due Process Clause require it to do. '2 31 In conclusion, Mukasey
again ordered counsel to consult with one another regarding the terms
of Padilla's access to counsel, saying:
Lest any confusion remain, this is not a suggestion or a request that
Padilla be permitted to consult with counsel, and it is certainly not
an invitation to conduct a further "dialogue" about whether he will
be permitted to do so. It is a ruling-a determination-that he will
be permitted to do so. 232
On March 20, 2003, the Government notified the court by letter that
there were no conditions upon which it would agree to allow Padilla
to consult with an attorney. 233 In its letter, the Government informed
Mukasey that it intended to ask the court "either to determine the
conditions for consultation on its own," or to certify for interlocutory
appeal the determination that Donna Newman may act as next friend
in pursuing the habeas corpus petition on Padilla's behalf.234 On
April 9, 2003, over Newman's objection on Padilla's behalf, Judge
Mukasey granted the Government's motion for interlocutory ap-
peal.235 Judge Mukasey broadened the issues for appeal beyond that
requested by the Government, however, allowing consideration of all
230. Padilla, 243 F. Supp 2d at 54. The government argued that the standard of proof in this
case, which is "some evidence," mooted the requirement that Padilla be heard. Id. The govern-
ment asserted that the "some evidence" standard had been met as long as the evidence relied
upon by the President (in the Mobbs Declaration) justified his detainment of Padilla. Id. at 54.
Mukasey disagreed with the Government, finding that exculpatory evidence of a defendant is
relevant to whether the government has met the "some evidence" standard if the evidence di-
rectly undermines the reliability of the government's evidence. Id. at 55-56.
231. Id. at 56. Mukasey continued:
[The court's job is to] confirm what frankly appears likely from the Mobbs Declaration
but cannot be certain if based only on the Mobbs Declaration-that Padilla's detention
is not arbitrary, and that, because his detention is not arbitrary, the President is exercis-
ing a power vouchsafed to him by the Constitution. As set forth in the [December 4
opinion], because the only practicable way to present evidence, if he chooses to do so,
is through counsel, he must be permitted to consult with counsel.
Id.
232. Padilla, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 57.
233. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, No. 02 Civ. 4445 (MBM), 2003 WL 1858157, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9,
2003).
234. Id. (citing Letter of Comey to the Court of 3/20/03, at 1-2). The government relied on 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) in asserting its right to interlocutory appeal. Id.
235. Id. Newman urged that that certification for appeal was an attempt by the government to
"further delay the progress of the case." Id. Mukasey noted that, while § 1292(b) is meant to be
applied bnly in exceptional circumstances, "it would be deeply irresponsible for a district court
2003]
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determinations from the orders of December 4, 2002, and March 11,
2003.236 He stated, "The resolution of these questions upon an imme-
diate appeal is likely to advance materially the ultimate termination of
the litigation. '237 Padilla is still being held without charges and with-
out access to an attorney based on his enemy combatant status.
238
C. An Analysis of President George Walker Bush's Actions
President Bush did not exceed his authority as Commander-in-
Chief by creating military commissions for the trial of enemy combat-
ants. 239 In doing so, however, President Bush improperly extended
the commissions' jurisdictional scope set forth in previous cases.
While the government must procure a means to prevent future attacks
on American soil, the current procedures implemented by the Bush
to deny a brief stay at least to permit further application to the Court of Appeals in the face of
the government's insistence that issues of national security are at stake." Id.
236. Padilla, 2003 WL 18581587, at *2. These questions include: 1) whether Secretary of De-
fense Rumsfeld was the proper respondent in the case; 2) whether the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York had personal jurisdiction over Secretary Rumsfeld;
3) whether the President has the authority to designate an American citizen captured within the
United States as an enemy combatant thereby allowing him to be detained for the duration of
armed conflict with al Qaeda; 4) what burden the government must meet to detain a petitioner
as an enemy combatant; 5) whether the petitioner has the right to present facts in support of his
habeas corpus petition; and 6) whether it was a proper exercise of the district court's discretion
to direct that Padilla be afforded access to counsel for the purpose of presenting facts in support
of his petition. Id.
237. Id. At the time of this Comment's publication, the Court of Appeals has not yet ruled on
the government's interlocutory appeal. Padilla is still being held without charges and without
access to an attorney based on the theory that he is an enemy combatant. Padilla, 233 F. Supp.
2d. at 571. "Newman has averred that she was told she would not be able to visit Padilla at the
South Carolina facility, or to speak with him; she could write to Padilla, but that he might not
receive the correspondence." Id. (citing Newman Affidavit of Sept. 4, 2002 1 8).
238. Id. at 571. At the time of this Comment's publication, a divided panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Bush Administration lacks the
authority to detain Padilla as an enemy combatant without a more explicit grant of authority
from Congress as required under 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000). Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695
(2d Cir. 2003). Further, all three judges on the panel agreed that Padilla is entitled to meet with
his attorney. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on February 20, 2004, Rumsfeld v. Pa-
dilla, No. 03-1027, 2004 WL 95802 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2004), and will hear Padilla's case on April 28,
2004. See http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme-court/docket/2003/april.html (last visited Mar.
2, 2004).
239. President Bush had both the protection of the Constitution and guidance of the Supreme
Court supporting presidential creation of military commissions. Neither Milligan nor Quirin
concluded that the President clearly had the authority to create military commissions without the
consent of Congress. In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) acts as a bar against the detainment of
American citizens absent congressional authorization. Vladeck, supra note 141. However, Pres-
ident Bush relied on several statutes, the Constitution, and a Congressional joint resolution in
validating his November Order. See supra notes 134-137.
860
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Administration fail to adequately "protect the innocent and prevent
possible abuses of power. 240
The events of September 11 are similar to those in Ex parte Quirin
and justify the President's creation of military commissions for the
trial of individuals associated with those attacks. In applying Quirin,
however, President Bush has ignored the Court's emphasis on the
type of conduct worthy of defining an enemy combatant and failed to
offer his own definition in return. Such disregard carries with it signif-
icant potential for an abuse of power. In addition, the procedures im-
plemented for the trial of enemy combatants 241 are unlawfully
depriving two American citizens of their civil liberties and have
opened the door to a potential abuse of the separation of powers.
242
1. A Wavering Definition of Enemy Combatant
In reliance on Congress's joint resolution authorizing him to use all
necessary and appropriate force against individuals involved in terror-
ist attacks hostile toward the United States,2 43 President Bush reini-
tiated the use of the enemy combatant designation previously used by
President Roosevelt during World War II. In addition, President
Bush created military commissions for the trial of any individual he
determined was an enemy combatant. As previously discussed, ade-
quate precedent exists to justify the Bush Administration's use of the
enemy combatant label and his formation of military commissions.
244
However, Quirin, the case directly relied upon by President Bush in
240. Sonnett, et al., supra note 22.
241. See Commission Order, supra note 149.
242. See infra notes 255-259 and accompanying text. At the time this Comment went to publi-
cation, President Bush publicly designated another individual as an enemy combatant. On June
23, 2003, President Bush declared Ali Saleh Kahlah AI-Marri, a former resident of Peoria, Illi-
nois, as an enemy combatant. Cam Simpson, Bush Names 3rd Enemy Combatant, CHI. TRIB.,
June 24, 2003, at 1. According to administration officials, Al-Marri came to Chicago on Septem-
ber 10, 2001, at coordinate al Qaeda operatives for a second round of terrorist attacks. Id. Al-
Marri is a 37-year-old Qatari national and is the first person facing criminal charges in the
United States to be "pulled out of the civilian justice system and placed into military custody."
Id. While Al-Marri was not involved in the September 11 bombings, Larry Mefford, the FBI
assistant director for counterterrorism, said he was a key operative of al Qaeda. Id. Al-Marri
was initially scheduled to stand trial in Peoria on July 21, 2003 on fraud-related charges and for
allegedly lying to the FBI. Id. These charges were dropped subsequent to Bush's declaration,
and AI-Marri is now jailed in a naval brig in Charleston, South Carolina. Id. While Al-Marri is
not an American citizen, his public classification as an enemy combatant deserves mention be-
cause it displays Bush's continued use of the label over two years after al Qaeda's attack on
America.
243. PL 107-40, supra note 131 and accompanying text. Bush interpreted that authority as
allowing him to designate any individual posing a potential threat to the United States as an
"enemy combatant." See supra notes 134-140 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 43-124 and accompanying text.
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asserting his authority, also placed limitations on its scope. Assuming
the definition of an enemy combatant set forth in Quirin is still good
law, two elements must be present. First, an individual must not be
dressed in clothing that identifies him as a belligerent.245 Second, the
person must secretly cross enemy lines for the purpose of waging war
by destruction of life or property.246 The Bush Administration has
ignored both requirements.
Since the attacks of September 11, only two American citizens,
Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla, have been designated enemy combat-
ants.247 The facts of Padilla's case248 closely echo those of the Quirin
defendants and might justify the designation of Padilla as an enemy
combatant. On the other hand, Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan
while visibly holding arms against America.2 49 He neither entered the
United States nor attempted to disguise his enemy status, making his
enemy combatant designation inconsistent with Quirin's holding. Fur-
thermore, Hamdi's capture was practically identical to John Walker
Lindh's, 250 who recently pled out of enemy combatant status. 251
Lindh will possibly be released from prison in twenty years, while
Hamdi is presently being detained indefinitely with no charges
brought against him.2 5 2 To frustrate the situation further, non-citizen
terrorist suspects whose conduct falls squarely within the Quirin defi-
nition are not being labeled enemy combatants. For example,
Zacarias Moussaoui, the alleged twentieth terrorist involved in the at-
tacks on September 11, was arrested and charged with conspiracy to
commit terrorism and the murder of a federal employee. 25 3 Mous-
saoui is facing trial in a federal court, however, not in a military
tribunal. 25 4
President Bush has disregarded Quirin's guidance, thereby elimi-
nating any determinative factor in the labeling of an enemy combat-
ant. This has resulted in an arbitrary and random designation of
enemy combatants. It appears that President Bush can label any indi-
vidual whom he determines is a danger to our country or believes has
information concerning potential threats to our safety as an enemy
245. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 190-237 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 213-237 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 212.
253. Philip Shenon & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Considers Plan to Put Moussaoui Before Tribunal,
Prrr. POST-GAZET[E; at A.17.
254. Id.
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combatant. This allows for a potential abuse of power. The label has
become a bargaining chip, used by the government to coerce coopera-
tion from suspected terrorists. But unlike a typical plea bargain, in
which the prosecution offers a lower charge in return for the defen-
dant's cooperation, the government is bargaining with constitutional
rights. The first ten amendments to the Constitution are known as the
Bill of Rights, not the Bill of Privileges. The government cannot "of-
fer" a defendant a predetermined right in return for his or her cooper-
ation. For this reason, President Bush should be precluded from using
the enemy combatant designation on an individual unless that per-
son's conduct fits the predetermined definition set forth in Quirin.
2. A Deprivation of Due Process
While Congress provided President Bush with authority to create
military commissions,255 the trial procedures within the commissions
must "comport with constitutional due process. '256 Unfortunately,
Quirin did not take a position as to what minimal procedural require-
ments would be constitutional. 257 Subsequent to his order creating
the military commissions, President Bush gave himself final review of
all cases tried before the military commissions, thereby removing judi-
cial review of any case involving an enemy combatant from the federal
courts.258 First, President Bush places the enemy combatant label on
whomever he desires. 259 Second, he creates a military commission for
the trial of that individual-a commission over which he determines
the procedures and has final appellate review.260 Third, he removes
all judicial review of these trials from the federal courts. 261 It appears
that President Bush, in an effort to protect our nation's security, has
255. See November Order, supra note 24.
256. French, supra note 45, at 1251.
257. Id. Of course, Bush's failure to use Quirin's definition of enemy combatant leaves us
unsure whether any guidelines for procedural requirements of a military commission would have
been followed anyway.
258. See November Order, supra note 24, § 4(c)(8).
259. Id. § 2(a). "The term 'individual subject to this order' shall mean any individual ... with
respect to whom I determine from time to time..." Id. (emphasis added).
260. Id. § 1(f). "I find consistent with [10 U.S.C. § 836], that it is not practicable to apply in
military commissions under this order the principles of law and rules of evidence generally rec-
ognized in the trial of criminal cases in United States district courts." President Bush delegated
much of this authority to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Id. § 4(b) (stating "As a mili-
tary function and in light of the findings in section [one] ... the Secretary of Defense shall issue
such orders and regulations . . . as may be necessary to carry out [a trial by military
commission]").
261. Id. § 4(c)(8). "[Slubmission of the record of the trial, including any conviction or sen-
tence, for review and final decision by me or the Secretary of Defense if so designated by me for
that purpose." Id. (emphasis added).
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substantially exceeded his authority, consequently diminishing any
separation of powers. Essentially, President Bush has created an insti-
tution whereupon the executive branch is the judge, jury, and
executioner.
While the Quirin court never addressed the procedural require-
ments by which a military commission must abide, ample evidence ex-
ists to support a claim that the procedures currently employed by the
Bush Administration are inadequate. The strongest basis for this as-
sumption rests in the fact that the Quirin defendants were able to seek
judicial review of their detainment and were represented by attor-
neys. 262 It seems paradoxical that the current enemy combatants,
Hamdi and Padilla, are held incommunicado and denied access to
counsel. Often times it is necessary for the government to detain a
person in order to prevent him or her from causing further harm.
However, the power of the government to detain an individual has
serious implications on that person's individual rights and liberties.
To ensure protection of due process, the Bush Administration should
strongly consider a response to al Qaeda that preserves jurisdiction
within civilian courts.
D. An Extension of New York v. Quarles as an Alternative to the
Enemy Combatant Designation
The government claims that the safety of American citizens is at
risk, requiring it to use enemy combatant labels on individuals in pos-
session of information concerning future potential terrorist strikes. 263
Because enemy combatants are deprived of several constitutional pro-
tections, the government is able to interrogate them for prolonged pe-
riods of time, without the presence of an attorney, concerning future
potential attacks on America. As seen in the cases of Hamdi and Pa-
dilla, the government can detain enemy combatants indefinitely with-
out charging them in order to procure information vital to public
safety.264 In addition, the government can use any confessions ob-
tained through these interrogations against an individual in his trial
before a military commission.265
If the primary goal of the government during this "war on terror-
ism" is to gather information vital to protecting the public, 266 then the
262. Sonnett, et al., supra note 22, at 9.
263. See supra note 138.
264. See supra notes 190-237 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
266. A significant amount of evidence supports the argument that gathering intelligence is a
primary goal of the government. See supra note 24; see also News Briefing, Department of
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means chosen to reach this goal are too far-reaching. The government
can protect the public while at the same time provide all individuals
with their fundamental rights. This section highlights a likely reason
for the government's fear of using civilian courts for the trial of all
suspected terrorists and presents a possible solution that would allow
the government to meet its goal without violating the Constitution.
1. A Fear of Miranda
The government refuses to try all suspected terrorists in civilian
courts because it fears certain individuals will invoke their rights
under Miranda v. Arizona.267 If brought to trial in a civilian court, an
enemy combatant would be given full protection of the Constitution,
including the Fifth Amendment's requirement that law enforcement
refrain from further interrogation of a suspected criminal when the
suspect determines it is in his best interest to remain silent.2 68 An-
other restraint on law enforcement's ability to interrogate a criminal
suspect is an invocation of his right to counsel.269 Essentially, an indi-
vidual in custody of the government who invokes his rights under Mi-
randa and its progeny cannot be interrogated further. If the
government fails to follow this rule, it risks having the statements or
Defense, June 12, 2002, "[O]ur interest really in [Padilla's] case is not law enforcement, it is not
punishment because he was a terrorist or working with terrorists. Our interest at the moment is
to try and find out everything he knows so that we can stop other terrorist acts." Id.
267. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the Supreme Court applied the Fifth Amendment's
right against self-incrimination to custodial interrogations (i.e., interrogations where a suspect
reasonably believes he is not free to leave), holding that a custodial confession is presumed
involuntary, and therefore inadmissible at trial, if a suspect is not first warned by law enforce-
ment that: 1) he has the right to remain silent; 2) any statements he makes can be used against
him; 3) he has the right to an attorney; and 4) an attorney will be appointed to him if he cannot
afford one. Id.
268. When a suspect has invoked his right to silence, the interrogating officer must immedi-
ately stop interrogation. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). The Mosley Court determined
that a suspect's invocation of his right to silence must be "scrupulously honored" by the interro-
gating officer. Id. The Court declared that it was permissible, however, for an officer to re-
initiate questioning at a reasonably later time. Id.
269. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Edwards was arrested and informed of his
Miranda rights. Id. at 473. Initially, he agreed to be questioned, but in the middle of the interro-
gation he changed his mind and said he wished to consult an attorney. Id. The officers never
provided him with counsel. Id. at 482. Rather, officers approached Edwards in jail the following
day and attempted to reinitiate questioning. Edwards refused to talk, at which time the officers
told him he "had to." Id. at 479, 482. Unlike the right to silence discussed in Mosley, supra note
268, the Supreme Court provided a greater protection to Edwards because he had invoked his
right to counsel. The Court said that an accused, "having expressed his desire to deal with the
police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until coun-
sel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,
exchanges, or conversations with the police." Id. at 484-85 (emphasis added).
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confessions against that individual suppressed at his or her trial.270 It
appears that the government has avoided the use of civilian courts for
this reason.
The government might argue that it is not concerned with whether
or not a suspected terrorist's statements can be used against him at
trial because its chief concern is to prevent future attacks. This con-
tention is flawed. An officer who ignores the rights of one suspected
terrorist to obtain information in relation to the potential threat of
another terrorist might prevent an impending attack, but he or she
runs the risk of having key evidence against the former suppressed-
the prevention of one might result in the release of the other. Conse-
quently, the government must decide if it will play by the rules to en-
sure the conviction of one threat, or disregard the rules to gain
information necessary to stop another. Rather than make this deci-
sion, the government has chosen to place these individuals in military
camps where it can question them freely without consequence. There
is, however, another option that would allow the government to have
its cake and eat it too.
2. A Miranda Exception
The 1984 United States Supreme Court decision of New York v.
Quarles27t provides a much needed solution to the government's en-
emy combatant dilemma. In Quarles, two police officers, Frank Kraft
and Sal Scarring, drove to an A & P supermarket in pursuit of Benja-
min Quarles after a young woman claimed he raped her.272 While
Officer Scarring radioed for assistance, Kraft entered the store and
spotted Quarles. 273 Upon seeing Kraft, Quarles ran toward the rear
of the store.274 Kraft pursued Quarles, frisked him, and found he was
wearing an empty shoulder holster.275 While Quarles was handcuffed
270. This was an issue in the case of John Walker Lindh. M.K.B. Darmer, Lessons From the
Lindh Case: Public Safety and the Fifth Amendment, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 241 (2002). "The legal
case against Lindh was based largely upon admissions he made to interrogators . . . without
counsel." Id. (citing Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Sup-
port Of Motion to Compel Production of Discovery in Response to Government's March 15,
2002, Notice of Documents Filed in Camera at 1, United States v. Lindh (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-
37-A)). Ultimately, the Lindh case was settled prior to trial, leaving the courts unable to deter-
mine whether his statements would have been suppressed. See supra notes 175-178 and accom-
panying text.
271. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
272. Id. at 651. The woman didn't identify Quarles by name, rather she described Quarles as
a six-foot-tall black male carrying a gun and wearing a black jacket with the name "Big Ben"
printed on the back. Id.
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and lying on the floor of the supermarket, and before he was informed
of his Miranda rights, Kraft asked Quarles where his gun was. 276
Quarles nodded in the direction of some empty cartons and stated,
"the gun is over there. '277 Subsequent to retrieving the gun, Kraft
placed Quarles under arrest and read him his Miranda rights.2 78
In the prosecution of Quarles for criminal possession of a weapon,
the trial court excluded the admission of the gun and all statements
concerning the gun from evidence because Kraft failed to first inform
Quarles of his Miranda rights.279 The Appellate Division of New
York and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. 280 The Supreme
Court reversed, finding a public safety exception to the prophylactic
rules set forth in Miranda.281 The Court agreed the ultimate inquiry in
determining whether Miranda warnings must be given is "whether
there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the
degree associated with a formal arrest. 2 82 The Court also noted that
situations arise when an officer's need to protect either himself or an-
other makes adherence to a police manual impossible.283 The Court
described Miranda v. Arizona as a cost-benefit analysis,28 4 where the
right against self-incrimination outweighed the need for criminal con-
victions.285 The Court conducted its own balancing test and con-
cluded, "[T]he need for answers to questions posing a threat to the
public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting
the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. '286 In
creating a public safety exception, the Court considered the restraint
on time an officer often encounters when detaining dangerous individ-
276. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 652. At this point, at least three other officers had arrived and
surrounded Quarles when questioned about his gun. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. After reading Miranda rights to Quarles, the officer asked him more questions con-
cerning the gun, such as whether he owned it and where he bought it. Id.
279. Id. The court found that the detainment of Quarles by the officers and Kraft's question
concerning the gun satisfied the requirements for custodial interrogation, thus requiring Kraft to
give Quarles his Miranda warnings. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 653.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 655 (citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).
283. Id. at 656. The Court stated, "[W]e do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of
Miranda require that it be applied in all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask ques-
tions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety." Id.
284. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657. "[Wlhen the primary social cost of those added protections is
the possibility of fewer convictions, the Miranda majority was willing to bear that cost." Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. (emphasis added). The Court declined to place law enforcement officers in the un-
comfortable position of determining whether protecting the admissibility of criminal testimony
outweighs public safety.
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uals.287 However, an officer's need to make a spontaneous decision
was not a determinative factor of the public safety exception.288
3. Extending the Scope of Quarles
Before presenting an argument in favor of extending the Quarles
opinion, a brief discussion must be had regarding the current stability
of the Quarles decision. The public safety exception to Miranda set
forth in Quarles is part of a line of cases designed to limit the efficacy
of Miranda.289 As the Court noted in Quarles, "The rationale in many
of these limiting decisions was that the Miranda warnings-while 'pro-
phylactic' rules designed to safeguard constitutional rights-are not
themselves constitutionally mandated. '290 This argument generated
strong opposition, especially in Justice Thurgood Marshall's dissenting
opinion to Quarles.291 Eventually, the United States Supreme Court
in Dickerson v. United States292 discussed the constitutionality of the
Miranda rules at length, declaring Miranda a constitutional deci-
sion.293 While none of the "prophylactic" cases to Miranda has been
overruled, Dickerson has "the potential to undermine the stability of
Quarles and the rest. ' 294 However, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority in Dickerson, believed that declaring the Miranda de-
cision constitutional is not inconsistent with the prophylactic line of
287. Id. at 656. "Where spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is necessarily
the order of the day, the application of the exception which we recognize today should not be
made to depend on ... the subjective motivation of the arresting officer." Id.
288. Id. at 657. The Court stated, "We decline to place officers ... in the untenable position
of having to consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether it best serves society for them to ask
necessary questions without Miranda warnings and render whatever probative evidence they
uncover inadmissible." Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657. (emphasis added). The term "often" implies
that an imminent threat to public safety may trigger the public safety exception, but other fac-
tors, such as threats of a catastrophic nature that are likely to occur in the near (but not immedi-
ate) future, may also trigger the use of this exception.
289. Darmer, supra note 270, at 264.
290. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 684 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
291. Justice Thurgood Marshall stated:
In fashioning its 'public-safety' exception to Miranda, the majority makes no attempt to
deal with the constitutional presumption established by that case .... Miranda was not
a decision about public safety; it was a decision about coerced confessions. Without
establishing that interrogations concerning the public's safety are less likely to be coer-
cive than other interrogations, the majority cannot endorse the 'public-safety' excep-
tion and remain faithful to the logic of Miranda ...
Id.
292. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
293. Darmer, supra note 270, at 268.
294. Id.
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cases.2 95 Further support for the continued vitality of the Quarles de-
cision-in light of Dickerson-is found in lower federal courts.2 96
The Supreme Court has not addressed the scope of the public safety
exception since its decision of Quarles in 1984.297 Because the Court's
determination in Quarles focused on an imminent threat to public
safety,2 98 one can only speculate what other circumstances would
weigh in favor of a public safety exception. The situation tormenting
the Bush Administration-a suspected terrorist possessing informa-
tion pertinent to the prevention of future terrorist attacks-is best il-
lustrated by the magnitude of the threat rather than by its immediacy.
While the Quarles Court did not discuss how the magnitude of a pub-
lic threat would influence its decision, it is farfetched to argue that a
bomb going off in a crowded building is less of a public safety concern
than a hidden gun, simply because the bomb might not detonate for
twenty-four hours. While the future of Quarles is uncertain, there is
no better time to test its vitality than in the wake of a domestic terror-
ist attack.2 99 To accomplish this objective, the government should ar-
rest and charge American citizens suspected of being terrorists under
federal statutes 300 and argue for a good faith extension of Quarles,
rather than place them in military camps.
IV. IMPACT
The American public is in the midst of war with a faceless enemy.
The threat of terrorism has extended to our backyards, our work-
places, and our homes. We are scared. We want protection. We de-
mand it. Our government has not only the right, but also the duty to
defend us-to protect our right to life. However, the technique cur-
rently employed by the government carries dangers of its own. The
designation of enemy combatants might have a negative impact on the
legitimacy of the Bush Administration. The judiciary is likely to reject
any contention that Bush's conduct is lawful in light of his arbitrary
use of the enemy combatant label and the constitutional restrictions
295. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441. The court viewed the prophylactic cases as "illustrat[ing] the
principle-not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule-but that no constitutional rule is immu-
table." Id.
296. In United States v. Jones, 154 F. Supp. 2d 617 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), the Southern District of
New York found "no suggestion in Dickerson that Quarles and other exceptions to Miranda
have been overruled." Id. at 623 n.7.
297. See Darmer, supra note 270, at 271.
298. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
299. For a more extensive discussion on the future of Quarles in light of the Dickerson deci-
sion, see generally Darmer, supra note 270.
300. This action would be similar to actions taken against Lindh, Moussaoui, and others. See
supra notes 167-201, 251-252 and accompanying text.
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placed on its victims. 30 t Therefore, President Bush must limit the
scope of his enemy combatant definition or find some alternate way of
protecting our lives while simultaneously protecting our liberties. If
he fails to do so, the legitimacy of his administration could be injured.
Our nation's laws are founded on a set of predetermined neutral
principles. The credibility of our government depends on its adher-
ence to these predetermined principles, especially during turbulent
times.302 Successful compliance with this concept results in easily pre-
dictable legal consequences to any given action, regardless of the ac-
tor.30 3  This "rule of law" facilitates public satisfaction with
government, allowing the government to prosper and grow. Alterna-
tively, a lack of compliance with these principles not only removes
predictability, but it risks discrediting the legitimacy of the entire sys-
tem. 30 4 The governed depend on the neutral characteristics of the
governing. If the perception of neutrality is lost, so is the governing
body's respect and authority. This concept of legitimacy, discussed in
depth by Isaac Balbus,30 5 places a restraint on the political body of the
government, such that "legal rationality and predictability ... require
that the legal system be insulated from the immediate political con-
flicts of the day and the shifting substantive goals of any particular set
of political actors. '306
In dealing with the threat of future terrorist attacks, President Bush
must consider the potential impact of his actions on the legitimacy of
his administration. Enemy combatant designations might save many
lives by frustrating the plans of hostile enemies, but this process ig-
nores previously established procedures designed to serve the same
301. See supra note 297.
302. See ISAAC D. BALBUS, THE DIALECTICS OF LEGAL REPRESSION: BLACK REBELS BEFORE
THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTS, ch. 1 (Russell Sage Found. Pub. 1973). In his book, Balbus
addresses the question, "how can [a state] reconcile [its] immediate interest [of ending violence]
in order with [its] long-run interest in maximizing [its] legitimacy?" In response, Balbus con-
tends, "[L]egitimacy in the liberal state resides in the rule of law as an autonomous body of
norms and procedures to which even the sovereign is subject, a legitimacy interest not easily
reconciled with the short-run interest in ending violence as quickly as possible." Id.
303. Quoting Weber, Balbus says:
The modern capitalist concern is based inwardly above all on calculation. It requires
for its survival a system of justice whose workings can be rationally calculated, at least
in principle, according to fixed general laws, just as the probable performance of a
machine can be calculated .... Thus, it guarantees to individuals and groups within the
system a relative maximization of freedom, and greatly increases for them the possibil-
ity of predicting the legal consequences of the actions ....
Id. at 4.
304. Id.
305. See supra note 302.
306. BALBUS, supra note 302, at 4-5.
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purpose. It can be argued that when two possible means exist that
ultimately lead to the same end, both are equally acceptable. How-
ever, when one process adheres to predetermined principles of equal-
ity and fairness and the other expressly departs from such, the former
will remain consistent with society's perceptions of the system, while
the latter will foster distrust. The procedures President Bush ig-
nored-criminal procedures in civilian courts and wartime procedures
for the treatment of prisoners of war-adequately discipline society's
outlaws in a manner consistent with predetermined American princi-
ples.30 7 President Bush's continued designation of enemy combatants
arbitrarily ignores these principles. President Bush's line between
criminal and combatant is hazy, making it conceivable that one person
will be tried under the full protection of American justice while an-
other person will be tried under a completely different system for es-
sentially the same crime. Eventually, Padilla or Hamdi will have an
opportunity to argue against their detainment before the United
States Supreme Court.308 It is unlikely the Court will support Presi-
dent Bush's interpretation of Quirin or Milligan. While both cases
allow for the detainment and trial of American citizens before military
commissions, President Bush's administration disregarded specific
limitations placed on the commissions by these cases; specifically, it
failed to follow Quirin's definition of enemy combatant, and it created
excessive procedures for trial by these commissions.30 9 These two fun-
damental flaws will ultimately lead the Supreme Court to rule that
President Bush's interpretation of Quirin, while congressionally au-
thorized and constitutional on its face, expands his power to the point
where it is immune from review by any other governmental branch.
In light of such findings, President Bush's administration must confine
its use of the enemy combatant designation to that set forth in Quirin
or rely on a different method for the purpose of obtaining information
vital to the public's safety.
The Bush Administration would benefit greatly from a Quarles ex-
tension. Based on the circumstances surrounding the war on terror-
ism, it is likely that the Supreme Court would extend the public safety
exception to allow for extended interrogation of suspected terrorists.
The Supreme Court determined that Benjamin Quarles's missing gun
307. These "predetermined American principles" include the fundamental rights provided by
the Constitution-the rights discussed throughout the course of this Comment, such as judicial
review, due process, and representation by counsel.
308. In fact, during the publication of this Comment, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to both Hamdi and Padilla. Both cases are scheduled to be heard on Wednes-
day, April 28, 2004. See supra notes 212 and 238.
309. See supra notes 146-161 and 240-250 and accompanying text.
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created an imminent threat to the safety of the police officers and
individuals near the crime scene. While there exists a great deal of
debate as to whether the circumstances surrounding Quarles's arrest
truly posed a safety threat,310 it is unquestionable that a ticking time
bomb would create such a scenario.
Our country is facing its largest threat in sixty years. In support of a
Quarles extension, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit explicitly approved the use of a public safety exception in a
case involving a terrorist plot.311 In United States v. Khalil, police of-
ficers thwarted an attempt by two men to detonate pipe bombs held
within their apartment.312 While Abu Mezer, one of the defendants,
was in the hospital,31 3 the police questioned him as to the number of
bombs and their locations, without Mirandizing him.314 The district
court found that the facts surrounding the incident justified using the
public safety exception. 315 The Second Circuit affirmed the lower
court's ruling through an expansive reading of the Quarles opinion.316
For this reason, it seems likely that the Supreme Court would allow
for an expanded reading of Quarles to protect the actions of law en-
forcement officers attempting to ferret out potential terrorist activity.
With an expansion of Quarles, the Bush Administration could lawfully
avoid Miranda while questioning suspected terrorists. Law enforce-
ment officials could lawfully deny an individual the right to confer
with an attorney, interrogate him about other terrorist plots and not
worry that statements made by him during the interrogation will be
suppressed at his trial thereby resulting in his release. This appears to
be the most favorable method for the simultaneous conviction of ter-
rorists and prevention of terror.
310. The incident occurred at 12:30 a.m. when the convenient store was fairly empty. New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 652 (1984). In addition, three other police officers arrived on the
scene to assist officers Kraft and Scarring. Id. at 653.
311. See United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2000).
312. Id. at 115.
313. Both defendants were shot and wounded by the police when the police raided their
apartment. Darmer, supra note 270, at 272.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 273. In fact, Mezer only appealed the introduction of a statement he made in
response to the question of whether he intended to kill himself in the explosion. Id. In response
to the question, Mezer responded, "Poof." Id. The Second Circuit, in upholding the district
court's use of the public safety exception for the inquiry, disagreed with Mezer, "given that Abu
Mezer's vision as to whether or not he would survive his attempt to detonate the bomb had the
potential for shedding light on the bomb's stability." Darmer, supra note 270, at 273 (quoting
Khalil, 214 F.3d at 121) (internal quotation marks omitted). Darmer has pointed out, "If a state-
ment can be admissible under Quarles on this basis alone, it augurs the potential for a significant
expansion of the public safety exception." Id.
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The government must be cautious in continuing to implement its
designation of enemy combatants. When America is faced with crisis,
a "great deal of deference is given to the executive branch. But when
the president grabs power, it typically stays around until a period of
calm when Congress and the courts pull the president back in line. 317
History has shown our government often responds to threats with
good intentions only to apologize for its overreaction years later. It
happened with slavery; it happened with Koramatsu; and it is likely to
happen again today.
V. CONCLUSION
When a nation is threatened by an imminent attack on its citizens, a
natural reaction is to defend itself by any means necessary. However,
this response is quickly recognized as a dangerous overreaction not to
be practiced in a society such as ours. Our government must find an-
other way to protect our fundamental rights than by arbitrarily remov-
ing them from an unpopular minority of its citizens. Too often has our
government failed to do this; too late do we, as a society, come to
realize this. The hostile acts of al Qaeda must not go unpunished.
However, our governmentneeds to understand fully the consequences
of its actions before "jumping the gun." The indefinite detainment of
any American citizen incommunicado is immediately suspect. A deci-
sion by the president to try an individual in a commission created by
the president and with final review by only the president is equally
suspect. In all likelihood, the Supreme Court will rule such a method
unconstitutional.
Hope still exists, however, in our struggle to win this war on terror-
ism. Place these men in civilian courthouses. Allow them appellate
review. Disarm the President of unlimited power. The potential dan-
ger of international terrorism on our country and the relentless char-
acter of the enemy creates a public safety exception to the restrictions
traditionally placed on law enforcement. Use it! Use it well and we
may be able to both stop a bomb and convict a bomber. Ignore it and
this war may never end.
Jeffrey S. Becker*
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